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Delay in Notice of Tort Claim Against
a Government Agency
William P. Farrall*
D ESPITE AN ONSLAUGHT of criticism' and a rationale predicated on
the discredited doctrine of Divine Right of Kings, 2 the rule of
sovereign immunity still exists in many states. 3 As a result of this
anachronism,4 municipalities and other subdivisions of state government
have continued to escape liability for the tortious conduct of their
agents. 5 This situation has persisted despite a tendency by the courts
to restrict rather than extend the principle of immunity.6 Statutory
enactments such as short term notice provisions applied against po-
tential plaintiffs by states and their subdivisions, when strictly con-
strued by the courts, have had the effect of a short term statute of
limitation.7 The result of such construction is the exacerbation of the
fiction of immunity.
Intent Behind Notice Provisions
The courts have rendered many opinions relevant to the intent of
notice provisions. A New Jersey court in Atlantic Aviation Corp. v. Port
of New York Authority,s argues logically that the intent of the notice
statute in question is three-fold: (1) to advise the city of the "existence
and nature" of a claim; (2) to allow time for a city investigation; and
(3) in the absence of settlement, to allow the city to prepare a de-
fense. A court in Kansas similarly defended the intent of short term
notice provisions as (1) to inform the city of the place where the
accident occurred so the city could correct the defective condition, (2)
to allow the city to ascertain the extent of the claimant's injuries, and
* A.B., Muskingum College; Third-year student at Cleveland State University Col-
lege of Law; law clerk for a Cleveland law firm.
I Kirksey v. Ft. Smith, --- Ark. _, 300 S.W. 2d 257 (1957); Wendler v. Great Bend,
181 Kan. 753, 316 P. 2d 265 (1957); Wendler v. Neblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah
573, 111 P. 2d 800 (1941) concurring opinion; Bingham v. Board of Education, 118
Utah 562, 223 P. 2d 423 (1950) dissenting opinion; Britten v. Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382,
51 N.W. 2d 30 (1952); see also 60 A..R. 2d 1198 (1958); and Borchard, Government
Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1 (1924), and 36 Yale L.J. 759 (1927); and see, Oleck,
Negligence Forms of Pleading, Sec. 256 (and forms therein) (1957 rev. ed.).
2 Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939) at 1377.
3 Annot., 25 A.L.R. 3d 322 (1969).
4 Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939).
5 Boreffi v. Town of Vestal, 33 A.D. 2d 1073, 307 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (1970).
6 Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203, 89 A.L.R. 387 1933; Hoggard v. Richmond,
172 Na. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939), 120 A.L.R. 1368 (1939).
7 Harte v. City of Eagle River, 45 Wis. 2d 513, 173 N.W. 2d 683 (1970).
8 66 N.J. Super. 15, 168 A. 2d 262 (Law Div. 1961).
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finally, (3) to allow the city opportunity to investigate accidents while
all facts were current.9
In Mapley v. Board of Education,10 the rationales of avoidance of
"surprise," prevention of stale claims, and protection against needless
litigation were accepted by the New York court as reasons to uphold
the notice statutes. In Grams v. Independent School District No. 742,11
a Minnesota court commented upon the importance of an investigation
so that a determination of "truth" could be made along with an evalua-
tion of the merits of the claim. An Indiana court felt "prompt investi-
gation" was the purpose of the statute.12 An Idaho court reasoned that
to avoid depleting already small city treasuries was reason enough for
notice provisions.1" Finally, a Texas court frankly admitted that it was
anxious to avoid tort suits involving governmental bodies based on pe-
cuniary demands. 14 Courts in most jurisdictions have advanced a vast
array of apparently logical rationales for notice provisions. However,
it is not the superficial logic with which we should be concerned, but
rather the far reaching calamities occurring as a result of these pro-
visions.
Undesirable Effects of Strict Compliance
With the various judicial pronouncements fresh in our minds let
us examine some of the acrimonious results of court opinions of the
notice provisions. In the New York case of Bauer v. City of New York, 1"
the plaintiff, an infant, seriously injured as a result of the negli-
gence of a city employee, was denied recovery because of her failure
to comply with New York's notice provisions as set out in the General
Municipal Law. This decision was sustained by the appellate court
despite the fact that an investigation had been made and the city was
not prejudiced by her failure to file timely notice.
A second illustration of the undesirable effects of these provisions
is demonstrated in Murray v. City of Milcord, Connecticut.16 The ap-
pellant, a minor, was denied relief for her failure to comply with a
30 day notice provision. A five month delay in notice occurred here and
completely barred the action regardless of mitigating circumstances.
Perhaps in the minds of some a delay of five months could be too long
a delay to be justified, but can a 24 hour delay be rationalized honestly
9 Cornett v. City of Neodesha, 187 Kan. 60, 353 P. 2d 975 (1960).
10 175 N.Y.S. 2d 354 (App. Div. 2d 1958).
11 176 N.W. 2d 539 (Minn. 1970).
12 Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 255 N.E. 2d 225 (Ind. 1970).
13 Jorstad v. County of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 456 P. 2d 766 (1968).
14 City of El Paso v. Nicholson, 361 S.W. 2d 415 (Tex. App. 1962).
15 33 App. Div. 2d 784, 307 N.Y.S. 183 (1969).
16 380 F. 2d 468 (2d Cir. 1967).
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NOTICE OF TORT TO GOVERNMENT
and squared against the policy arguments set forth by the courts? In
another New York case the plaintiffs were injured on September 20,
1968, and promptly contacted an attorney.1 - The attorney drafted the
notices within the statutory period, but failed, because of a busy sched-
ule, to serve notice on the necessary authorities until 91 days had passed.
The plaintiffs' claim was denied. It was just one day late. Such a de-
cision demonstrates with clarity that the courts were certainly look-
ing with an eye to something other than justice. Such a decision takes
us back to the Medieval era protecting the "sovereign" at all costs.
New York and Connecticut do not have a monopoly on strict con-
struction of notice provisions. A Michigan court in Trbovich v. City of
Detroit,18 held, with two justices strongly dissenting, that the plaintiff,
who was rendered mentally and physically incompetent as a result of
the city's non litigated negligence, was denied recovery on the ground
that she had failed to comply with the notice provision. This unfortunate
decision was rendered despite the fact that her disability had extended
through the duration of the entire notice period. Case after case clear-
ly shows that the logic which various courts apparently use to justify
the short notice statutes are bankrupt attempts to justify an unjustifi-
able position of sovereign immunity.
The shallowness of the arguments upholding the short notice
statutes is again shown in the New York case, Corso v. City of New
York,19 wherd the plaintiff was not permitted to file his notice of claim
against the city, nunc pro tunc, despite a hospital admission diagnosis
which consisted of eleven different injuries, including a possible skull
fracture. The plaintiff, in addition to all his other injuries, had suf-
fered amnesia and was, at the time of the required notice, in critical
condition in the hospital. The court sanctimoniously realized the in-
justice of the circumstances, but found it necessary to deny the plain-
tiff's claim under the law. The court was not willing to interpret the
legislature's enactment in other than a strict manner. It did, however,
urge the legislature to change the law so the courts could cope more
equitably with such situations.
A Texas court has gone so far as to deny recovery to a plaintiff
for failure to comply with notice provisions even where the injury did
not come to light until after the period had run!20 And for a final
example, a Kansas court attempted to rationalize a denial of recovery
to a plaintiff because she had also failed to file timely notice of claim,
despite the fact that she was totally unconscious for the duration of
the entire notice period.2 1
17 Martinez v. New York City, 33 App. Div. 2d 669, 305 N.Y.S. 2d 34 (1969).
18 378 Mich. 79, 142 N.W. 2d 696 (1966).
19 20 App. Div. 2d 504, 248 N.Y.S. 2d 816 (1964).
20 Wagstaff v. City of Groves, 419 S.W. 2d 441 (Tex. 1967).
21 Workman v. City of Emporia, 200 Kan. 112, 434 P. 2d 846 (1967).
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Possible Defenses to Strict Notice Requirements
Some state courts have reacted quite differently to the results of
judiciary construction of short notice provisions, and not all courts
have been willing to accept the unreasonably harsh results of strict
construction of notice provisions. 22 Many courts have turned to several
appropriate and valid legal doctrines, including substantial compliance,
waiver, and estoppel to circumvent harsh results.
An example of a rational application of substantial compliance is
illustrated in a recent New Jersey case. 23 On January 15, 1968, the
plaintiff fell on an icy parking lot at Newark airport. He immediately
reported the accident to a police officer and was treated at the airport
medical clinic. On January 19th a representative from the airport
sent a notice to the plaintiff requesting him to call in regard to his fall
at Newark Airport. On May 16th of the same year, an attorney for the
plaintiff directed a letter to the Port Authority advising that he was
representing the plaintiff, alleging the Port Authority's negligence and
inquiring as to the Authority's prospectus of disposition. On May 21,
of the same year, the defendant sent the requisite forms to the plain-
tiff's attorney, with an accompanying letter requesting that said forms
be filled out, or if the attorney preferred to use his own forms, he could
do so as long as he met the requirements of the statute. On June 11th
the plaintiff's attorney sent a letter to the Port Authority along with
the plaintiff's medical reports, requesting an amicable adjustment of
the claim. The attorney had not filled out the forms sent to him. On
December 3rd of the year, the plaintiff's attorney sent a letter to the
Port Authority confirming a previous telephone call and advising that
said phone conversation should be considered a notice of claim. In an
ensuing paragraph the attorney set forth the information required by
the statute. On January 7, 1969 a claim based on negligence was filed.
The defendant Port Authority set forth in their answer as a first de-
fense, that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the notice statute.
The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. The appellate court
framed the question in terms of substantial compliance and pointed out
initially that they could not find any statutory history which would
indicate that the legislature intended to exclude the doctrine of sub-
stantial compliance. The court then pointed out that the doctrine de-
veloped to avoid technical defects destroying otherwise meritorious
claims. The court went on to say that the statute should never be
construed in such a way as to defeat valid claims on the basis of a mere
technicality alone. Finally, the court pointed out that the defendant
22 Corso v. City of New York, supra n. 19; see also Barrso v. Pepin, 261 A. 2d 277
(R.I. 1970); Reich v. State, 17 Mich. App. 619, 170 N.W. 2d 267 (1969); Cooper v. City
of Abilene, 416 S.W. 2d 562 (Tex. 1967); Willis v. Reddin, 418 F. 2d 702 (9th Cir.
1969); Powell v. City of Haysville, 203 Kan. 543, 455 P. 2d 528 (1969).
23 Zamil v. Port of New York Authority, 56 N.J. 1, 264 A. 2d 201 (1970).
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was in no way prejudiced by the plaintiff's failure to comply with the
claim notice requirements and that there was in fact substantial com-
pliance with the intent of the 60 day statute.
The court could have strictly construed the statute and technically
defeated the claim. However, the eye of the court was not focused
simply on the letter of the law. It refused to impose a 60 day de facto
statute of limitations on a meritorious claimant.
This New Jersey decision is not alone in the application of the
doctrine of substantial compliance. An Idaho court in Jorstad v. County
of Lewiston,24 made a similar application where the plaintiffs, seven
minors, were awarded judgment in a wrongful death action despite a
12 month and 27 day delay in notice. The court logically reasoned that
the most important criteria should be whether the goal of a notice statute
had been achieved, and further noted that the statute should not be con-
strued in an unconscionable manner. Similarly a Utah court in Hatch v.
Webber County, refused to strictly interpret the notice statute in ques-
tion because to do so "would be to sanction a miscarriage of justice. '25
The Michigan 26 and Indiana 27 courts are also committed to a similar
rule.
Another principle used by the courts to circumvent the harsh
results of strict construction of notice provisions is that of waiver.
Although the authorities are in conflict,28 courts have seen fit to hold
that such provisions can be waived by certain governmental conduct.
For example, a section of the Municipal Code of Detroit, Michigan pro-
vides that when computing the 60 day notice statute, if the last day
falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the plaintiff has an additional day
in which to file his claim.29
The Texas court in Smith v. City of Dallas,30 initially discussing
notice as a condition precedent to any action, pivoted and held that
such a condition precedent could be waived. The court agreed with
the appellants who contended that the acts of a city agent who had
investigated the accident lulled them into a feeling of security, and this
constituted a waiver of notice. This view was reiterated in City of
Denison v. Fulce.31 In that case the court cited Smith v. City of Dallas,32
24 Jorstead v. County of Lewiston, supra n. 13.
25 23 Utah 2d 144, 459 P. 2d 436 (1969).
26 Stacey v. Sankovich, 173 N.W. 2d 225 (1969).
27 Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, supra n. 12.
28 Multi-volume: 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 53.156 (rev. 3d ed., 1963;
1969, Supp.).
29 Murphy v. City of Detroit, 2 Mich. App. 473, 140 N.W. 2d 473 (1966).
30 404 S.W. 2d 839 (Tex. App. 1966).
31 437 S.W. 2d 277 (Tex. App. 1969).
32 Smith v. City of Dallas, supra n. 30.
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and Cawthorne v. City of Houston,33 as the two Texas examples of an
exception to the general rule in Texas of strict compliance with notice
statutes.
Another argument for a more logical approach by the government
agency to this problem is a waiver of sovereign immunity up to the
amount of insurance. This view was presented in City of Knoxville,
Tennessee v. Bailey,. 4 where the court intimated that it would be
totally nonsensical for the taxpayers to purchase private insurance and
then have the carrier deny liability on the principle of immunity.
A third rule applied by courts to circumvent the harsh results
of strict construction of notice statutes is the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. A California court in Shoban v. The Board of Desert Center
Unified School District,35 echoes the thoughts of Mr. Justice Holmes
and, in harmony with his concept of justice, held that equitable estoppel
may be invoked against the government, particularly in this case where
the tort claimant had been misled by governmental employees in respect
to procedural or time requirements of a claim statute. A Florida court,
while refusing to apply the doctrine on the facts in the case, did com-
ment that a city may be estopped from pleading failure to file notice
if the facts of the case dictate.30 A Georgia court in City of Atlanta v.
Frank,37 denied the protection of the immunity where it appeared that
an attorney acting on behalf of a city had plenary powers to act on
the matter in question, and said attorney had solemnly acted to assure
the plaintiff that he had received notice and made investigation and
had advised the plaintiff that the investigation revealed that the city
should deny the claim, such assertions by the attorney estopped the
city from successfully pleading noncompliance with the claims statute.
Similarly a Colorado court held that where the city attorney had
acknowledged receipt of a letter notifying the city as to the incidence
of the cause of action, the city was estopped from pleading noncom-
pliance with the statute even though the notice provision was not
complied with to the letter of the statute.
38
There are, fortunately, other doctrines available to the courts to
reach equitable results when injured plaintiffs have failed to comply
with notice provisions. The doctrine of excuse by reason of infancy
was adhered to in Simpson v. City of Abilene.3 9 The plaintiff, a seven
year old, was excused from complying with Abilene's notice provision as
33 231 S.W. 701 (Tex. App. 1921).
34 222 F. 2d 520 (6th Cir. 1955).
35 81 Cal. Rptr. 112 (Cal. App. 1969).
36 Matthews v. City of Tampa, Fla., 227 S. 2d 211 (Fla. App. 1969).
37 120 Ga. App. 273, 170 S.E. 2d 265 (1969).
38 Wilson v. City and County of Denver, 449 P. 2d 822 (Colo. 1969).
39 388 S.W. 2d 760 (Tex. App. 1965).
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a matter of law. This view, however, was not shared in a similar situ-
ation by the New York court in Anderson v. County of Nassau.40 The
court held as a matter of law that the delay was not attributable to the
child's infancy and therefore was not excused. The court however,
pointed out that the statute in question has been interpreted incon-
sistently by New York courts. Further the court urged a uniform
judicial interpretation of the statute and suggested that it would favor
a broad construction which would allow the court the reasonable dis-
cretion to excuse untimely notice due to infancy.
The rationale commonly used by the courts to excuse notice on
the basis of infancy is that realistically speaking notice presupposes the
existence of one legally capable of giving notice. A child is normally
deemed as one not able to give legal notice, hence notice must be
excused.4 1 The question whether notice of an infant is excusable may
hinge on the age of the minor. The disability of a mature twenty year
old though a legal minor in some states will not be weighed in the same
light as that of an immature fifteen year old, or that of a seven year
old. The concept is variable. Where one is excused in a specific in-
stance, another may not be excused, despite the age of minority.42
Infancy is not the only disability which the courts recognize as suf-
ficient to excuse compliance with the notice provisions. Mental and
or physical incapacity denied the immunity in a New York court. With
two justices dissenting, it was held that a delay of 175 days was excus-
able where the plaintiff had suffered a double leg amputation, had en-
dured large doses of drugs and the natural shock which would ac-
company such an ordeal.4 3 Similarly Alaskan courts, recognizing the
necessity of essential justice, have held that notice is excused any time
the incapacity to give notice is a result of an injury caused by the sov-
ereign. To hold otherwise would:
Make it possible for the city to take advantage of and benefit from
its own wrong.
44
Or in the words of Mr. Justice Butler:
Be equivalent to offering this suggestion to municipalities: If you
are negligent on any occasion, see to it that your negligence is suf-
ficiently gross to insure the complete physical and mental disability
of the victim; for by doing so, you will avoid the necessity of pay-
40 31 App. Div. 2d 761, 297 N.Y.S. 2d 665 (1969).
41 Annot., 34 A.L.R. 2d 725 (1954). Illinois, Montana and New York have allowed
infancy as an excuse. Infancy is not an excuse in Alabama, California, Colorado,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Tennessee, Utah
and Washington.
42 Anderson v. County of Nassau, supra n. 40.
43 Millington v. New York City Transit Authority, 33 App. Div. 2d 737, 305 N.Y.S. 2d
810 (1969).
44 Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P. 2d 34 (Alaska 1965).
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ing damages, which you would be required to pay if the victim
were left in possession of his faculties.
45
Pennsylvania courts have followed a rule of "reasonable excuse"
as set forth under Pennsylvania statute.46 An example of an applica-
tion of this rule is seen in Yurecho v. County of Allegheny.47 The
plaintiff had failed to give timely notice due *to his own ignorance of
the law. The court excused the delay reasoning that ignorance of either
the plaintiff or his attorney, coupled with no prejudice to the munici-
pality constituted a "reasonable excuse."
Conclusion
It seems apparent that claim provisions are another example of
"blind (in)justice." It is this author's opinion that the "Lady" open at
least one of those eyes and do what many legislators have failed to
do, reform the law of notice of claim. The reformation should be com-
plete. To make it complete would require total abolition of claim of
notice provisions. The government is protected from stale claims in
the same manner as the private sector, that is by the statute of limita-
tions. There is no good reason for it to enjoy an additional protection.
The King is dead, long live the People!
45 City and County of Denver v. Taylor, 88 Colo. 89, 292 P. 2d 594, 72 A.L.R. 833
(1930).
46 Pa. Gen. Laws, C. 53, § 53101.
47 430 Pa. 325, 243 A. 2d 372 (1968).
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